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We study the rock-paper-scissors game in structured populations, where the invasion rates determine individual
payoffs that govern the process of strategy change. The traditional version of the game is recovered if the payoffs
for each potential invasion stem from a single pairwise interaction. However, the transformation of invasion rates
to payoffs also allows the usage of larger interaction ranges. In addition to the traditional pairwise interaction, we
therefore consider simultaneous interactions with all nearest neighbors, as well as with all nearest and next-nearest
neighbors, thus effectively going from single pair to group interactions in games of cyclic dominance. We show
that differences in the interaction range affect not only the stationary fractions of strategies but also their relations
of dominance. The transition from pairwise to group interactions can thus decelerate and even revert the direction
of the invasion between the competing strategies. Like in evolutionary social dilemmas, in games of cyclic
dominance, too, the indirect multipoint interactions that are due to group interactions hence play a pivotal role.
Our results indicate that, in addition to the invasion rates, the interaction range is at least as important for the
maintenance of biodiversity among cyclically competing strategies.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Rock is wrapped by paper, paper is cut by scissors, and
scissors are broken by a rock. This is the simple blueprint
of the rock-paper-scissors game, where the three competing
strategies form a closed loop of dominance. The game is
popular among children and adults to decide on trivial disputes
that have no obvious winner, but it is also the basis for the
explanation of fascinating evolutionary processes that describe
the essence of predator-prey interactions and evolutionary
games [1–4]. Foremost, games of cyclic dominance play
a prominent role in explaining the intriguing diversity in
nature [5–11], but they are also able to provide insights into
Darwinian selection [12] as well as structural complexity [13]
and prebiotic evolution [14].
Cyclic interactions may also arise spontaneously in evo-
lutionary games where the number of competing strategies
is three or more. For example, cyclic dominance has been
observed in public goods games with volunteering [15,16],
peer punishment [15,17,18], pool punishment [19,20], and
reward [21,22], but also in pairwise social dilemmas with
coevolution [23,24] or with jokers [25]. The ample attention
to the theoretical aspects of cyclical interactions is fueled by
actual observations of such interactions in nature. Prominent
examples include the mating strategy of side-blotched lizards
[26], overgrowth of marine sessile organisms [27], genetic reg-
ulation in the repressilator [28], and competition in microbial
populations [29–32].
The key to the sustenance of biodiversity, in addition
to the inherent closed loop of dominance that governs the
evolution of such systems, is often spatial structure [33–35].
In experiments with Escherichia coli, for example, it has been
shown that arranging the bacteria on a Petri dish is crucial for
keeping all three competing strains alive [8,36]. Accordingly,
simulations of spatial rock-paper-scissors and related games
of cyclic dominance have a long and fruitful history [37–56],
which is firmly rooted in methods of statistical physics. In
general, if the mobility in the population is sufficiently small
[7], the spatial rock-paper-scissors game leads to the stable
coexistence of all three competing strategies, whereby the
coexistence is maintained by the spontaneous formation of
complex spatial patterns. Most intriguing recent examples
of this phenomenon include the observation of labyrinthine
clustering [57] and interfaces with internal structure [58].
Here we wish to extend the scope of the spatial rock-
paper-scissors game by abandoning the common assumption
of single pairwise interactions. Traditionally, when two players
are randomly selected from the population, one is able to
invade the other based on the governing food web and the
invasion rates [59,60]. In reality, however, the fitness of each
individual player not only depends on one nearest neighbor
but also may be influenced by all nearest neighbors and
beyond. Going from pairwise to simultaneous interactions in
a group is known to vitally affect the outcome of evolutionary
games [34], but this transition has been neglected in games
of cyclic dominance. To overcome this, we consider that the
invasion rates determine individual payoffs, which in turn
govern the process of strategy change. The traditional version
of the game is recovered if the payoffs for each potential
invasion stem from a single pairwise interaction, but the game
differs if we consider interactions with nearest and next-nearest
neighbors for the accumulation of payoffs. As we will show,
the differences in the interaction range can decelerate as well
as revert the invasion between the competing strategies, thus
qualitatively changing the evolutionary outcome that would be
expected based on the pairwise consideration of the governing
food web. Indirect multipoint interactions that are due to
simultaneous interactions within a group thus play a pivotal
role in games of cyclic dominance, similarly as reported before
for evolutionary social dilemmas [61].
The organization of this paper is as follows. We present
the definition of the model and the elementary results that
hold under well-mixed conditions in Sec. II. Main results are
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FIG. 1. (Color online) Schematic presentation of the food web
that describes the closed loop of dominance between the three
competing strategies. Just like where rock is wrapped by paper, paper
is cut by scissors, and scissors are broken by a rock, here strategies
0 (medium gray), 1 (light gray), and 2 (dark gray) form a closed
loop of dominance. If the game is governed by individual pairwise
interactions, the probabilities of invasion are determined by δ0, δ1,
and δ2, respectively. If the game is governed by group interactions,
however, these probabilities are transformed into payoffs that may
dictate altogether different evolutionary outcomes.
presented in Sec. III. We conclude with the summary of the
results and a discussion of their implications in Sec. IV.
II. MODEL DEFINITION
We consider the classic rock-paper-scissors game, where
the three strategies cyclically dominate each other, as depicted
schematically in Fig. 1. For convenience, we refer to the strate-
gies as 0, 1, and 2, where strategy 0 invades strategy 2 with
probability δ0, strategy 1 invades strategy 0 with probability
δ1, and strategy 2 invades strategy 1 with probability δ2.
The stationary state can be described by the fractions of
strategies where ρi denotes the fraction of strategy i ∈ (0,1,2)
in the population. In a well-mixed system, the time dependence
of ρi is described by the following system of differential
equations:
ρ˙i = δiρiρi+2 − δi+1ρiρi+1, (1)
where i runs from 0 to 2 in a cyclic manner. Due to the defined
dynamics, the sum of all ρi is conserved and is always equal to
1. The stationary values of ρi are easily obtained according to
ρi = δi+2∑
i δi
, (2)
where i again runs from 0 to 2 cyclically. This result indicates
that the fractions of strategies are determined unambiguously
by the three invasion rates. As reviewed in the Introduction,
however, it is frequently assumed that the interactions among
the competing strategies, which are summarized by the
corresponding invasion rates, are more complex and in fact
are described by a structured population. It is known that the
transition from a well-mixed to a structured population affects
the evolutionary outcome of the rock-paper-scissors game in
both qualitative and quantitative ways. The question we seek
to answer is whether the same holds on structured populations
if we go from individual pairwise interactions to simultaneous
group interactions.
For the spatial version of the game, we consider that each
player is located on the site x of a square lattice with periodic
boundary conditions, where the grid contains L × L sites. The
three strategies are initially distributed uniformly at random
with no sites left empty. We adopt the strategy notation of
three-dimensional unit vectors as follows:
sx = 0 =
⎛
⎝
1
0
0
⎞
⎠, or sx = 1 =
⎛
⎝
0
1
0
⎞
⎠, or sx = 2 =
⎛
⎝
0
0
1
⎞
⎠.
Accordingly, the payoff of player x against the neighbor at
site y can be expressed by the following matrix product:
x = s+x M · sy, (3)
where s+x denotes the transpose of the state vector sx . In the
present case, the payoff matrix is given by
M =
⎛
⎝
0 −δ1 δ0
δ1 0 −δ2
−δ0 δ2 0
⎞
⎠. (4)
The evolution of strategies proceeds in agreement with a
random sequential update, where during a full Monte Carlo
step every player receives a chance once on average to invade
one randomly selected neighbor. In particular, a randomly
selected player x will invade the neighbor y with the rate
proportional to x−y2 , where the acquisition of the payoffs
x and y depends on the type of interaction that governs the
evolutionary process. We will refer to an interaction as a “pair”
interaction when the two competing players interact only with
each other. As already noted, this returns the traditional version
of the spatial rock-paper-scissors game, where the payoffs
correspond directly to the invasion rates defined in Fig. 1.
Moreover, we will consider two additional cases, where the
interaction range is gradually extended from the mentioned
two-player interaction via the von Neumann neighborhood,
entailing four pair interactions with the nearest neighbors,
to the Moore neighborhood, entailing eight pair interactions.
In the latter case, a player interacts with its four nearest as
well as with four next-nearest neighbors simultaneously. This
transition from individual pairwise to group interactions for the
determination of payoffs is the key aspect of the current work.
In the following section, for the sake of simplicity, we fix
the invasion rate δ2 = 1, thus δ0 and δ1 remain as the two
free parameters. For technical reasons, we also always keep
both parameters within the interval 0.2  δ0,δ1  1 in order to
avoid heavy finite-size effects reported in Ref. [57]. By doing
so, we achieve that during the Monte Carlo simulations the
L × L = 400 × 400 system size is always sufficiently large to
get reliable results that are valid also in the large size limit.
Our main conclusions, however, are robust and remain valid
in the whole (δ0,δ1) ∈ [0,1] interval as well.
III. RESULTS
We begin by showing phase diagrams for different in-
teraction ranges in Fig. 2, where the phases are defined
according to the rank of strategy fractions in the population.
The (2,1,0) phase thus corresponds to a stationary state
where ρ2 < ρ1 < ρ0. The (1,2,0) phase, on the other hand,
corresponds to ρ1 < ρ2 < ρ0. In Fig. 2(a), we show the phase
diagram obtained in the well-mixed model. Since the invasion
rate δ1 determines the 1 → 0 invasion and the invasion rate
δ0 determines the 0 → 2 invasion, according to Eq. (2) the
expected result is a right diagonal across the δ1-δ0 plane that
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FIG. 2. (Color online) Phase diagrams in dependence on the
1 → 0 invasion rate δ1 and the 0 → 2 invasion rate δ0, as obtained
for (a) well-mixed interactions, (b) “pair” interactions, (c) von
Neumann interactions, and (d) Moore interactions. Phases are defined
according to the rank of strategy fractions in the stationary state. The
(2,1,0) phase, for example, corresponds to ρ2 < ρ1 < ρ0. The 2 → 1
invasion rate is fixed to δ2 = 1.
delineates the (2,1,0) → (1,2,0) phase transition. Replacing
well-mixed interactions with “pair” interactions on the square
lattice leads to expected quantitative and qualitative changes.
As depicted in Fig. 2(b), the (2,1,0) → (1,2,0) diagonal
becomes slightly upward bent, but, more importantly, a new
(1,0,2) phase emerges for large δ1 values that is missing under
well-mixed conditions.
Significantly more unexpected is the observation that re-
placing “pair” interactions with von Neumann interactions and
further with Moore interactions introduces further quantitative
as well as qualitative changes. These changes are no longer due
to the transition from well-mixed to structured populations but
are the sole consequence of different interaction ranges. As
depicted in Figs. 2(c) and 2(d), a new (2,0,1) phase emerges
for large δ0 values that is absent under well-mixed conditions
and “pair” interactions, moreover, the (1,0,2) phase that we
have observed for “pair” interactions vanishes. In addition to
these qualitative changes that are due to the transition from
pairwise to group interactions, quantitative changes responsi-
ble for the shifts in the position of the phase transitions on the
δ1-δ0 plane are also clearly inferable.
The quantitative and qualitative differences that are due
to different interaction ranges are displayed visually in
Fig. 3. Domains that are labeled white indicate parameter
regions where different interaction ranges result in different
strategy rankings (qualitatively different phases), while do-
mains that are labeled black indicate regions with solely quan-
titative differences between the otherwise identical phases. To
explain these surprising differences, it is instructive to start
with the well-mixed interactions. In this case, the invasions
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FIG. 3. (Color online) Differences between the phase diagrams
depicted in Fig. 2. The upper panel depicts the differences between
“pair” and von Neumann interactions [Figs. 2(b) and 2(c)], while
the lower panel depicts the differences between von Neumann and
Moore interactions [Figs. 2(c) and 2(d)]. Regions in the δ1-δ0 plane
where different interaction ranges yield different phases (qualitative
differences) are labeled in white, while regions with the same phases
(quantitative differences only) are labeled in black.
between the players depend only on their strategies. If we
introduce spatial structure with “pair” interactions, then the
qualitative differences are expected because each player has a
limited range, and thus the invasions depends not only on the
strategies but also on the spatial configuration of players. These
differences are thoroughly documented and expected, and they
also exist in other evolutionary games, like, for example, in so-
cial dilemmas, where spatial reciprocity may help cooperators
survive where under well-mixed conditions they would perish
[62]. All the differences depicted in Fig. 3, however, do not
have the same origin, and the arguments that apply when going
from well-mixed to structured populations no longer apply
when going from pairwise to group interactions on structured
populations. Results presented in Fig. 3 evidence clearly that
both quantitative and qualitatively differences are common
when going from “pair” to von Neumann interactions (top), as
well as when going from von Neumann to Moore interactions
(bottom).
Instead of the known “well-mixed versus spatial” argu-
ments, it is important to acknowledge the fact that increasing
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FIG. 4. (Color online) Schematic presentation of two prepared
initial states that we employ to demonstrate the importance of indirect
multipoint interactions that arise due to group interactions. We
focus on the movement of the invasion front between homogeneous
domains of strategies, which is the main driving force behind spatial
pattern formation. In panel (a), only two competing strategies, green
(light gray) and blue (dark gray) are present, and hence the effect
of multipoint interactions is less significant. This initial state is
referred with subscript “2” in subsequent figures. In panel (b), on
the other hand, the interface is laced with players adopting the third
strategy (red, medium gray)—the third party—that do not partake in
strategy invasion, but they do interact with the other two competing
strategies. We use subscript “3” in subsequent figures when the latter
composition is used. Most importantly, if group interactions govern
the evolutionary process, the third-party players will affect the payoffs
and thus also the invasions between the green (light gray) and blue
(dark gray) competing strategies. To maximize the latter effect when
using Moore interactions, the fixed block of third-party players is
of the size 1 × 4, instead of the depicted 1 × 2 that we use for von
Neumann interactions. Colors used correspond to the 2 → 1 strategy
invasion, but the same schematic presentation can of course be used
for other examples as well.
the interaction range leads to indirect multipoint interactions
between players that may not be directly connected via the
interaction network and which in the absence of group inter-
actions would not be involved in the same elementary invasion
processes. The most important consequence of this fact is that
the relation between two neighboring competing strategies
will depend not only on the invasion rate between them as
defined with the basic food web but also on the presence (or
absence) of third parties. Other direct neighbors, as well as
next-nearest neighbors (depending on the interaction range),
may critically affect and indeed modify the relations defined
by the basic food web depicted in Fig. 1. To demonstrate the
validity of this argument, we study the movement of invasion
fronts between homogeneous domains of strategies, which are
the main driving force behind spatial pattern formation.
More precisely, we consider two different prepared initial
states, as illustrated in Fig. 4. First, shown in Fig. 4(a),
only two competing strategies are present. Here we monitor
the evolution of the frequency change of the dominant
strategy—the so-called excess frequency—when starting from
a symmetric initial state. In terms of the interaction range, we
distinguish three different cases. In the first case, which we
denote by P2, only the two individuals involved in the invasion
process interact with each other. In the second case players
collect their payoff from the interactions with their four nearest
neighbors (von Neumann neighborhood, hence, denoted by
N2). In the third case, we also consider the accumulation of
payoff via the Moore neighborhood, which we denote by M2.
Second, shown in Fig. 4(b), we insert blocks of third-strategy
players (red) along the interface. Importantly, the third party
is not involved directly in the movement of the interface. The
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FIG. 5. (Color online) Evolution of the excess frequency be-
tween two competing strategies, as obtained for δ1 = 0.98 and
δ0 = 0.25. Upper panel shows the competition between the predator
strategy 1 and prey strategy 0, while the lower panel shows the
competition between the predator strategy 0 and prey strategy 2.
In both panels, results obtained with the “pair” (P2, P3) and the von
Neumann (N2, N3) interactions are compared. It can be observed that
quantitative (top panel) and qualitative (bottom panel) differences
emerge as a consequence of the larger interaction range when
third-party players are present (N2 versus N3). In case of “pair”
interactions the differences are absent between the evolutions of P2
and P3. We note that the curves are scaled with the appropriate factor
when the effective length of the invasion front is shortened by the
fixed third-type players.
red players are fixed and cannot change their strategy, nor
can they invade other players. Their only role is to influence
the payoffs of the competing green and blue players if the
conditions for this are given, i.e., in case of von Neumann
or Moore interactions. Similarly to the previously described
initial state, here, too, we distinguish the same three interaction
ranges, which we denoted by P3, N3, and M3, respectively.
Our goal is to determine how the presence of third-party
players influences the invasion between the two competing
predator-prey strategies.
In Fig. 5, we first compare the invasions between two
predator-prey strategies when pair and von Neumann inter-
action ranges are considered. As expected, if pair interactions
govern the evolutionary process, there are no consequences
stemming from the presence of the third strategy. Accordingly,
the P2 and P3 curves are identical in both panels. The early
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FIG. 6. (Color online) Evolution of the excess frequency be-
tween two competing strategies, as obtained for δ1 = 0.70 and
δ0 = 0.76. The upper panel shows the competition between the
predator strategy 2 and prey strategy 1, while the lower panel shows
the competition between the predator strategy 0 and prey strategy
2. In both panels, results obtained with the “pair” (P2, P3) and the
Moore (M2, M3) interactions are compared. As in Fig. 5, it can be
observed that quantitative (top panel) and qualitative (bottom panel)
differences emerge as a consequence of the larger interaction range
when third-party players are present (M2 versus M3). In case of “pair”
interactions P2 and P3 evolve similarly. We note that the curves are
scaled with the appropriate factor when the effective length of the
invasion front is shortened by the fixed third-type players.
evolution in case of von Neumann interactions without third-
party players (the N2 curve) is also almost the same as the P2
and P3 case, because sideward and backward neighbors give
zero contribution to the payoffs of the players who are at the
front of the invasion. The critical impact of the third-party play-
ers’ presence becomes obvious, however, when von Neumann
interaction range is applied. Here the multipoint interactions
that are due to the extended interaction range take full effect.
In the upper panel, the third strategy lowers significantly the
effective invasion velocity, thus leading to a slower rise of
the excess frequency of the predating strategy. It is important
to note that this effect alone is capable to shuffle the rank
of strategies, and thus qualitatively affect the phases, because
changing a single interaction rate could influence the whole
system due to cyclic dominance. But even more strikingly, as
depicted in the lower panel, multipoint interactions alone are
able to reverse the direction of invasion. Predators thus become
prey solely because of the nearby presence of a third strategy.
We note that group interactions do not always have such a
dramatic effect on the outcome of an evolutionary process,
and for some δ1-δ0 pairs the effective invasion velocity between
strategy domains remains practically unchanged, and the rank
between species is preserved. The most striking effects can be
observed in the regions labeled white in Fig. 3.
The same effects can also be observed if we compare
the outcome of pair and Moore interactions, as depicted in
Fig. 6. Results presented in the upper panel illustrate that the
deceleration of the invasion front of predators can be even more
spectacular. In the lower panel, the reversal of the direction of
invasion is also clearly inferable. Furthermore, the even larger
interaction range that is defined by the Moore neighborhood
reveals another effect of group interactions. Namely, in the
lower panel, there is obvious difference between the M2 and
P2 (and P3) curve. The early difference is due to the fact that
players at the front of the invasion are, unlike in the case
of the von Neumann interaction, now able to pick up extra
payoff from more players of the front line due to the extended
interaction range. This in turn accelerates the invasion of the
predators and thus shifts the M2 curve above the P2 and the P3
reference case.
Importantly, strategy configurations (not shown here)
demonstrate that the same invasion rates between individual
strategies can manifest in significantly different effective
invasion rates between competing domains, which ultimately
results in easily observable differences between the emerging
spatial patterns. Finally, we note that we have also tested the
robustness of our observations by using different host lattices.
For example, we have used the hexagonal lattice, where every
player has six direct neighbors and which is frequently used in
biologically motivated settings [63], and we have found that
this lattice yields phase diagrams that are very similar to those
that we have obtained for the square lattice in Fig. 2.
IV. DISCUSSION
We have studied the rock-paper-scissors game on a square
lattice, thereby focusing on the transition from pairwise
to group interactions governing the evolution of strategies.
In addition to the expected effects of spatiality, which
may introduce quantitative and qualitative changes in the
evolutionary outcomes if compared to the well-mixed case,
we have shown that the extent of the interaction range can
have likewise profound consequences. We have demonstrated
that increasing the interaction range from individual pairwise
interactions to von Neumann interactions and further to Moore
interactions can both decelerate the propagation of predator
strategy as well as revert the direction of invasion contrary to
its definition by the governing food web. These results cannot
be attributed to the traditional arguments that describe the
transition from well-mixed to structured populations. Instead,
we have shown that the key to understanding the emergent
phenomena when going from pairwise to group interactions
lies in the indirect multipoint interactions between players
that are due to the extended interaction range. These effective
multipoint interactions link together players that do not meet
directly, and which in the absence of group interactions
would not be involved in the same elementary invasion
processes. We have validated these arguments by studying the
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movements of invasion fronts between homogeneous domains
of strategies, which are arguably the main driving force
behind spatial pattern formation. Based on the monitoring of
the excess frequency of predators, we have confirmed both the
deceleration of invasion fronts as well as the reversal of the
direction of invasion. In conclusion, we have shown that group
interactions can have a profound impact on the outcome of
cyclic dominance games, even exceeding the impact reported
before for evolutionary social dilemmas, where in the absence
of strategic complexity solely the impact of noise becomes
independent of the topology of the interaction network [61].
Patterns resulting from cyclic dominance are common in
nature, ranging from bacteria [29,30,32] to plants [64,65]
to the scale of ecological systems [26,27]. Several previous
works have illustrated that invasion rates between competing
species can influence the resulting morphology [66]. Con-
versely, studying the morphology can be useful to deduce
the microscopic invasion rates between species if they are
not known, for example, when bacteria or plants struggle
for space. Our model illustrates, however, that conclusions
stemming from such a procedure can be misleading, since
the invasion rates alone do not determine the final fate of
the competing species and their morphology. Moreover, in
biological systems, it is widely accepted to measure the
invasion rates or competition coefficients directly between
species [66,67]. The presence of a third party, however, can not
only result in a quantitative change of the invasion velocity but
may also altogether change the direction of invasion. Naturally,
the weight of these arguments increases further if the number
of competing species increases, like, for example, in bacterial
warfare where more than one toxin is present [40]. Based
on the presented results, we emphasize that it is important
not to overlook the interaction range, which could also be
a key parameter that renders reverse engineering cyclical
interactions a very difficult undertaking.
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